

**BEFORE THE  
NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION**

**Re.**

**PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF 2010  
“CORE” ENERGY EFFICIENCY  
PROGRAMS**

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**Docket No. DG 09-170**

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF  
  
ROGER D. COLTON  
  
ON BEHALF OF  
  
THE WAY HOME**

**November 6, 2009**

1   **Q.   PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS.**

2   A.   My name is Roger Colton. My address is Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, Public  
3       Finance and General Economics, 34 Warwick Road, Belmont, Massachusetts,  
4       02478.

5

6   **Q.   BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?**

7   A.   I am a principal in the firm of Fisher Sheehan & Colton, Public Finance and  
8       General Economics of Belmont, Massachusetts. In that capacity, I provide  
9       technical assistance to a variety of federal and state agencies, consumer  
10      organizations and public utilities on rate and customer service issues involving  
11      telephone, water/sewer, natural gas and electric utilities.

12

13   **Q.   FOR WHOM ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

14   A.   I am testifying on behalf of The Way Home, a non-profit housing service provider.

15

16   **Q.   PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.**

17   A.   I work primarily on low-income utility issues. This involves regulatory work on  
18      rate and customer service issues, as well as research into low-income usage,  
19      payment patterns, and affordability programs. At present, I am working on various  
20      projects in the states of New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina,  
21      Colorado, New Mexico and Toronto. My clients include state agencies (e.g.,  
22      Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate, Maryland Office of Peoples Counsel,  
23      Iowa Department of Human Rights), federal agencies (e.g., the U.S. Department of

1 Health and Human Services), community-based organizations (*e.g.*, Community  
2 Action of New Mexico, Community Action Partnership of Oregon), and private  
3 utilities (*e.g.*, Citizens Gas and Coke Utility, Xcel Energy, Tacoma Public Utilities).  
4 In addition to state- and utility-specific work, I engage in national work in the United  
5 States and Canada. For example, I worked on a team that recently completed a  
6 national study of the responses of water utilities to the payment troubles of  
7 residential customers for the American Water Works Association Research  
8 Foundation. In 2007, I was part of a team that performed a multi-sponsor  
9 public/private national study of low-income energy assistance programs.

10

11 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.**

12 A. After receiving my undergraduate degree from Iowa State University (1975), I  
13 obtained further training in both law and economics. I received my law degree from  
14 the University of Florida in 1981. I received my Masters Degree (economics) from  
15 the McGregor School (Antioch University) in 1993.

16

17 **Q. HAVE YOU EVER PUBLISHED ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY**  
18 **ISSUES?**

19 A. Yes. I have published more than 80 articles in scholarly and trade journals, primarily  
20 on low-income utility and housing issues. I have published an equal number of  
21 technical reports for various clients on energy, water, telecommunications and other  
22 associated low-income utility issues.

23

1   **Q.    HAVE YOU EVER TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS OR OTHER UTILITY**  
2           **COMMISSIONS?**

3    A.    Yes. I have previously testified before the New Hampshire Public Utilities  
4           Commission (NH PUC) on several occasions regarding energy issues affecting low-  
5           income and low-use customers. I have previously testified on behalf of the Staff, as  
6           well as on behalf of The Way Home. I have also testified in regulatory proceedings  
7           in more than 30 states and various Canadian provinces on a wide range of low-  
8           income utility issues.

9  
10   **Q.    PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY.**

11   A.    My testimony has the following objectives:

- 12           ➤ To review the CORE funding provided for low-income energy efficiency  
13           to determine whether that funding is reasonable for the 2010 budget year;  
14           and  
15           ➤ To determine whether it is possible to develop a rational formula-based  
16           approach to setting the CORE low-income budget each year.

17  
18   **Q.    WHAT DO YOU CONCLUDE**

19   A.    I reach the following conclusions in my testimony below:

- 20           ➤ The 14% budget allocation to low-income programs is a reasonable allocation  
21           for the coming 2010 budget year and should be approved.  
22           ➤ It is possible to develop a formula-based approach to setting the low-income  
23           CORE budget;

- 1           ➤ The formula-based approach that I recommend is based on long-established  
2           public policy in New Hampshire, on sound economics, and on sound  
3           regulatory principles; and
- 4           ➤ It would be reasonable to ramp-up the low-income budget to the level that I  
5           recommend over five years and to use the formula-based adjustment thereafter  
6           to set the annual low-income budget.

7

8   **Q.   PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR FINDING THAT DEVOTING 14% OF THE**  
9   **TOTAL CORE BUDGET TO LOW-INCOME EFFICIENCY IS A**  
10 **REASONABLE LOW-INCOME BUDGET FOR 2010.**

11   A.   As I explain in more detail below, I do not believe that the fact that the low-  
12   income budget is 14% of the overall CORE budget is the important factor to  
13   consider. The reasonableness of the low-income budget is to be judged by the  
14   extent to which that budget will help New Hampshire achieve an objective of  
15   serving 50% of the low-income customer base within a 10 year time period. The  
16   proposed \$2.8 million for 2010 reasonably advances that objective within the  
17   current year. Over time, however, as I describe below, the low-income budget  
18   should be increased in the manner and to the extent I discuss.

19

20   **PART 1. THE FOUNDATION OF LOW-INCOME EFFICIENCY POLICY.**

21   **Q.   HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS OF**  
22 **LOW-INCOME ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE?**

1     A.     Yes. I first reviewed the *Report to the New Hampshire Public Utilities*  
2           *Commission on Ratepayer-Funded Energy Efficiency Issues in New Hampshire*,  
3           Docket No. DR-96-150 (July 6, 1999) (hereafter “Working Group Report”). In  
4           addition, I reviewed the *Order Establishing Guidelines for Post-Competition*  
5           *Energy Efficiency Programs*, Order 23,574 (November 1, 2000). I further  
6           reviewed the Commission’s *Order Approving Settlement Agreement and Joint*  
7           *Request for Modification of Previous Commission Determination* in Docket No.  
8           DR-01-057. Order 23,850 (November 29, 2001). I finally reviewed various  
9           statutory sections (RSA 374-F:3,V; 3,VI; 3,X; RSA 374-F:4,VIII). These appear  
10          to be the foundational documents for the low-income efficiency program. I have  
11          reviewed each of the annual and quarterly filings on the CORE programs; the  
12          2009 GDS “Additional Opportunities” Report; and the June 2008 Low-Income  
13          Needs Assessment.

14  
15     **Q.     WHAT DO YOU DRAW FROM THESE FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS**  
16           **FOR YOUR PURPOSES HERE?**

17     A.     The Working Group Report recommendations were based on substantial  
18           documentation provided in Appendices attached to that Report. My purpose here  
19           is not to re-state the documentation and analysis contained in that report. Based  
20           on those Appendices,<sup>1</sup> the Low-Income Subcommittee of the Working Group  
21           recommended that New Hampshire’s low-income efficiency program should  
22           support the “funding and infrastructure to ultimately serve 2,500 low-income

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<sup>1</sup> Appendices 5, 5A, 5B and 5C were referenced as the documentation for the conclusions of the Working Group regarding low-income efficiency.

1 customers per year.” (Working Group Report, 10). The Working Group decided  
2 that an appropriate budget for low-income efficiency would be \$2.5 million per  
3 year. (Working Group Report, A35). This \$2.5 million number was determined  
4 based on the 2,500 customers to be served. Moreover, “per household expenditure  
5 is expected to be in the range of \$900 per baseload customer and \$1,500 per  
6 electric space heat customer.” (Working Group Report, A35). Under the  
7 proposed program design, the Working Group found, “it would take 10 years to  
8 serve one-half of the low-income subsector.” (Working Group Report, A40).<sup>2</sup>

9  
10 While the Commission did not adopt the entire Working Group report in its Order  
11 on energy efficiency (Order 23,574, November 1, 2000) (hereafter “Order”), the  
12 Commission did provide significant guidance on how to approach low-income  
13 efficiency investments. The Commission cited the statutory language, for  
14 example, providing that “utility sponsored energy efficiency programs should  
15 target cost-effective opportunities that may otherwise be lost due to market  
16 barriers.” (Order, 10). In addition, the Commission noted that low-income  
17 efficiency programs represent “an area where we believe well-designed, statewide  
18 programs could help to alleviate the apparent persistence of ‘undesirable market  
19 conditions,’ to use the language of the (Working) Group, characteristic of this  
20 group of customers.” (Order, 17).

21  
22 The “undesirable market conditions” cited by the Commission include:

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<sup>2</sup> By extension, the Working Group report would find that the low-income efficiency program could, absent duplication in the provision of services, treat all low-income households within a 20 year period.

- High initial capital costs;
- Lack of access to capital;
- High implicit discount rates/payback periods;
- High proportion of low-income renters;
- Split incentives between landlord and tenants;
- High mobility rate of low-income renters;
- Low education levels;
- Language barriers.

(Working Group Report, A39). In addition, the low-income market barriers to the installation of energy efficiency without public assistance include the high penetration of households at or below 150% of Federal Poverty Level; the small number of low-income units weatherized each year relative to the number of applicants (4,800 applicants; 660 units weatherized); and the high proportion of older housing units amongst low-income households (40% of low-income homes built before 1960). (Working Group Report, A40).

Finally, I consider the Commission decision in the 2002 proceeding regarding energy efficiency programs for natural gas utilities to set forth foundational principles even for the electric programs. According to the Commission's December 31, 2002 order in Docket DG-02-106 (Order No. 24,109), the low-income program budgets are dedicated and "those budgets cannot be siphoned away to other programs." (87 NHPUC 892, 899) (emphasis added). This principle has been adopted for the electric programs as well. Funds may not be



1 transferred from the low-income efficiency programs to other sectors without the  
2 prior approval of the Commission.

3  
4 **Q. HAVE YOU FORMED AN OPINION ABOUT THE CONTINUING**  
5 **RELEVANCE OF THESE COMMISSION DECISIONS AND**  
6 **OBSERVATIONS IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT?**

7 A. Yes. The "undesirable market conditions" cited by the Commission in its Order  
8 23,574 continue today. In many instances, the undesirable conditions cited by the  
9 Commission are even worse today than they were at the time the Commission  
10 first cited them in support of the need for the low-income efficiency program  
11 approved at that time. Accordingly, I recommend that the Commission adopt a  
12 funding principle that the CORE low-income efficiency program should be  
13 funded sufficient to reach 50% of all remaining low-income customers within a  
14 10-year period.

15  
16 **Q. WHAT UNDESIRABLE MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE YOU**  
17 **SPECIFICALLY CONSIDERED?**

18 A. I know from a review of empirical data relating to low-income households in New  
19 Hampshire:

- 20 ➤ Just as was true in 1999, low-income households today continue to remain  
21 shut out of the energy efficiency market by high capital costs. This includes  
22 not only the high capital costs associated with building shell improvements,  
23 but the high capital costs associated with appliance replacement as well.

- 1           ➤ Just as was true in 1999, low-income New Hampshire households today  
2           continue to lack access to capital for efficiency improvements.
- 3           ➤ While I have not performed a recent study, my experience leads me to  
4           conclude that low-income households today demand high implicit discount  
5           rates. When funds are limited, households tend to commit those funds only to  
6           investments with quick payback periods. Low-income discount rates in the  
7           range of 100% would not be unreasonable to find.
- 8           ➤ Just as was true in 1999, New Hampshire continues to have a high proportion  
9           of low-income renters. Renters not only lack the authority to make decisions  
10          regarding major energy consuming systems in their homes, but energy  
11          efficiency investments are impeded in low-income renter households by the  
12          split incentives between landlord and tenants that continue in New Hampshire  
13          today. Split incentives arise when the authority and ability to implement  
14          efficiency measures lies with the property owner, but the home energy bill is  
15          paid by the tenant.
- 16          ➤ Just as was true in 1999, low-income New Hampshire households, particularly  
17          low-income renters, continue to have a disproportionately high mobility rate.<sup>3</sup>  
18          This mobility rate can both be measured directly through an examination of  
19          the date in which New Hampshire households moved into their homes  
20          (reported in the U.S. Census Bureau's *American Community Survey*), and can

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<sup>3</sup> Empirical work I have previously undertaken concludes that housing units occupied by low-income households tend to remain occupied by low-income households even when they turn-over. See generally, Colton (1997). "Fair Housing and Affordable Housing: Availability, Distribution and Quality." 1997 *Colloqui: Cornell Journal of Planning and Urban Issues* 9.

1           be measured indirectly through an examination of the median date in which a  
2           household moved into its home.

3           The empirical data available for New Hampshire today supports the conclusion  
4           that the same “undesirable market conditions” that the Commission previously  
5           cited in support of adopting a low-income efficiency program continue at the  
6           same or increased levels today. No reason exists for the Commission to retreat  
7           from the finding that an appropriate level of funding would be that level sufficient  
8           to respond to those undesirable market conditions.

9  
10   **Q.   DO YOU MAKE YOUR LOW-INCOME EFFICIENCY FUNDING**  
11   **RECOMMENDATIONS BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON SOCIAL**  
12   **CONSIDERATIONS?**

13   A.   No. Clearly there is an element of social consideration in my recommendations.  
14       One objective of seeking to ensure that low-income households are treated with  
15       energy efficiency measures is to improve the affordability of service to these  
16       households. The New Hampshire Commission has previously recognized this  
17       social element of the electric efficiency program. In addition to this element of  
18       social policy to my recommendation, however, there are very strong regulatory  
19       policies that underlie my recommendations. The first regulatory policy is to  
20       implement all cost-effective energy efficiency potential within the state. Since I  
21       conclude, and the Commission has previously recognized, that the objective of  
22       implementing all cost-effective low-income energy efficiency cannot be met

1 through a market-based approach, the funding principle I recommend below will  
2 help meet this regulatory objective.

3  
4 The second regulatory objective is to deliver least-cost service to customers. The  
5 role of low-income energy efficiency investments in controlling arrears (and thus  
6 reducing working capital), in reducing uncollectible accounts, and in reducing the  
7 need for credit and collection activities directed toward low-income customers has  
8 been well-documented. The New Hampshire Commission, too, has recognized  
9 this regulatory objective.

10  
11 A third regulatory objective in New Hampshire for low-income energy efficiency  
12 is to help maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the State's Electric  
13 Assistance Program (EAP). To the extent that low-income consumption (and thus  
14 low-income bills) can be reduced through the implementation of energy efficiency  
15 measures, particularly for high use EAP customers, the dollars devoted to the  
16 EAP discount for any given individual customer will be reduced. As a result,  
17 additional low-income customers can be served through the EAP, thus extending  
18 the accompanying beneficial impacts of the EAP.

19  
20 In short, adopting the principle that 50% of remaining low-income customers  
21 should be treated with energy efficiency within a 10-year time period is not  
22 merely good social policy. The principle advances sound regulatory policies as  
23 well.

1

2 **Q. IN ADDITION TO THE CONSISTENCY WITH SOUND REGULATORY**  
3 **PRINCIPLES, WILL OTHER BENEFITS FLOW TO NEW HAMPSHIRE**  
4 **FROM THE FUNDING OF LOW-INCOME EFFICIENCY THAT YOU**  
5 **RECOMMEND?**

6 A. Yes. Low-income energy efficiency investments generate particular benefits to  
7 New Hampshire. Significant work has gone into quantifying the particular  
8 benefits that are generated by low-income energy efficiency investments. One  
9 review of the “adders” that regulatory agencies and analysts have associated with  
10 low-income efficiency found that the mid-point of the range of low-income cost-  
11 effectiveness adders (from high to low) would result in an adder of 172%. Setting  
12 an adder at one-third of the distance from high to low would result in an adder of  
13 103% for low-income programs. An absolute minimum would result in an adder  
14 of 50%.<sup>4</sup>

15

16 **Q. HAS ANYONE RECENTLY SPECIFICALLY CONSIDERED THE**  
17 **ADDITIONAL BENEFICIAL IMPACTS OF LOW-INCOME**  
18 **EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS?**

19 A. Yes. Pennsylvania’s natural gas and electric utilities have operated what that  
20 state’s Public Utility Commission (PUC) calls the Low-Income Usage Reduction  
21 Program (LIURP). LIURP involves the offer of the following types of usage  
22 reduction packages to low-income households: (1) an electric space heating

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<sup>4</sup> John Howat, et al. (1999). Analysis of Low-Income Benefits in Determining Cost-Effectiveness of Energy Efficiency Programs, National Consumer Law Center: Boston (MA).

1 package; (2) an electric water heating package; (3) a baseload electric package;  
2 and (4) a natural gas heating package.

3  
4 Pennsylvania's electric utilities deliver "baseload" electric LIURP services to  
5 homes that do not heat with electricity. Since LIURP first began in 1989,  
6 baseload electric jobs have represented roughly two-in-five (115,098 of 292,071  
7 total jobs: 39.4%) of all LIURP homes.<sup>5</sup> Over a 20-year period, baseload electric  
8 usage reduction jobs have outnumbered every other type of usage reduction  
9 treatment, including the treatment of electric space heating homes (n=85,999  
10 jobs).

11  
12 The objectives established for the Pennsylvania LIURP initiative are very similar  
13 to the objectives established for the New Hampshire CORE low-income program,  
14 including:

- 15 ➤ To assist low-income residential customers in conserving energy by  
16 reducing their energy consumption;
- 17 ➤ To assist participating households in reducing their energy bills;
- 18 ➤ To decrease the incidence and risk of customer payment delinquencies  
19 and the attendant utility costs associated with customer arrearage and  
20 uncollectible accounts; and
- 21 ➤ To reduce residential demand for electricity and gas, and peak demand  
22 for electricity.

23  
24 According to the January 2009 evaluation of the LIURP initiative:  
25  
26  
27  
28

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<sup>5</sup> Customer Services Information System Project, Pennsylvania State University (January 2009). *Long-Term Study of Pennsylvania's Low-Income Usage Reduction Program: Results of Analyses and Discussion*, prepared for Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Penn State University: State College (PA).

1 To meet these goals, LIURP is targeted toward low-income  
2 households with the highest energy consumption. Of these  
3 households, those with payment problems and high arrearages are  
4 targeted. Since the program's inception in 1988 through 2006, the  
5 major electric and gas companies required to participate in LIURP  
6 have spent over \$330 million to provide weatherization treatments to  
7 more than 292,071 low-income households in Pennsylvania.  
8

9 In January 2009, Penn State University released a comprehensive long-term  
10 evaluation of the LIURP program. Prepared for the Pennsylvania PUC, the  
11 evaluation examined data over the first 18 years of program operation. The  
12 evaluation provides important lessons for the offer of electric usage reduction  
13 services. The LIURP evaluation reported:

- 14 ➤ "LIURP is a cost-effective method of reducing both energy consumption and  
15 energy bill arrearages. . .Sixty nine percent of LIURP households reduce their  
16 energy consumption following weatherization treatments, with an average  
17 reduction of 16.5 percent." Electric baseload jobs generated a usage reduction  
18 of 698.2 kWh, or 19.1%.  
19
- 20 ➤ "Of those households with energy bill arrearages, 40 percent reduce their  
21 arrearage following weatherization services. Thirty-seven percent of electric  
22 industry households reduce their arrearages. . ."<sup>6</sup> LIURP was targeted to  
23 households with arrears (within the population of large consumers). The  
24 LIURP evaluation found that "by the end of the year following  
25 weatherization, 68 percent of the households have an energy bill arrearage, a  
26 decrease of 29 percent. . .Although the average number of full payments made  
27 does not vary from the pre- to post-period, the percent of households with  
28 missed payments decreased and the average number of partial payments  
29 increased."<sup>7</sup>  
30
- 31 ➤ "The [third] most significant, and most common, variable that is positively  
32 related to reductions in energy consumption is the amount of arrearage owed  
33 in the pre-period [before usage-reduction treatments are installed], suggesting  
34 that households with large arrearages are motivated to make the necessary  
35 behavioral changes to contribute toward additional reductions in energy

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<sup>6</sup> The LIURP evaluation found that this result was consistent with prior U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) research, which found that "low-income families who receive weatherization have a lower rate of default on their utility bills and require less emergency heating assistance." Bruce Tonn, et al. (2001). "Weatherizing the Home of Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program Clients: A Programmatic Assessment," U.S. Department of Energy: Washington D.C.

<sup>7</sup> The evaluation noted that participation in LIURP was associated with increased participation in energy assistance programs. It was difficult to distinguish the impact of the two.

1 consumption. It therefore makes sense to target households with higher  
2 arrearages when prioritizing LIURP jobs.”

3  
4 While low-income energy efficiency investments generate the traditional benefits  
5 (i.e., avoided energy and capacity costs) associated with usage-reduction  
6 programs, as is evident, the benefits flowing from low-income efficiency extend  
7 far beyond those traditional benefits.

8  
9 **Q. HAS NEW HAMPSHIRE’S LOW-INCOME ENERGY EFFICIENCY**  
10 **BUDGET MAINTAINED A CONSISTENCY WITH THE PRINCIPLE**  
11 **THAT 50% OF ALL REMAINING LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS**  
12 **SHOULD BE TREATED WITH EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS**  
13 **WITHIN A 10-YEAR PERIOD?**

14 A. No. New Hampshire’s low-income efficiency budget has not kept pace with the  
15 cost per low-income unit served through the CORE program. The cost per treated  
16 unit has increased significantly in recent years. While no single factor can be  
17 cited as “the” cause of this increase in costs –for example, according to the  
18 Community Action Agencies (CAAs), “2006 had a lower average (cost per unit)  
19 due to a large number of multi-family units which have a lower average cost per  
20 unit versus a single family unit” (CAA-NHLA-01(c))—the CAAs, which  
21 administer the low-income CORE program, report that:

22 ➤ “Blended WAP and CORE funded units have resulted in a high unit average  
23 mainly due to the addressing of electric (baseload) measures and  
24 weatherization measures by the CORE funding and the addressing of



1 weatherization measures and health and safety measures by the WAP  
2 funding.”

3 ➤ An increase in allowed expenditures per unit resulted in an increase in per-unit  
4 investment. According to the CAAs, “in 2009, the WAP limit was raised to  
5 an annual average of \$6,500 and the CORE maximum unit funding was raised  
6 from \$4,000 to \$5,000. This has resulted in the spike in the average cost per  
7 unit.” (CAA-NHLA-01(c)).

8 ➤ The cost of production has significantly increased. According to the CAAs,  
9 “pricing had remained basically flat to a 3% increase from 2004 until 2007, at  
10 which time insulation had taken a 26% increase and other weatherization  
11 products had increased 10+%. This resulted in an accumulated increase of  
12 approximately 15% in the last 2 years. . .The cost per unit is mainly driven by  
13 the cost of living.” (CAA-NHLA-02).

14 The average CORE rebate for low-income efficiency supports what the CAAs  
15 have reported in their narrative description of the low-income program costs.  
16 Setting aside the WAP part of blended WAP/CORE funding for low-income  
17 units, the average CORE low-income rebate has increased from \$1,779.33 in 2004  
18 to \$2,863.93 in 2009. Indeed, the average CORE low-income rebate has  
19 increased from \$2,038.14 in 2007 to \$2,863.93 in 2009. The cost per unit for  
20 each year 2004 to 2009 is set forth in Schedule RDC-1.

21  
22 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION?**

1 A. The principle underlying low-income funding recommendations going back to the  
2 original Energy Efficiency Working Group Report, that low-income program  
3 funding should be sufficient to allow 50% of all remaining low-income  
4 households to be weatherized within a 10-year period, cannot be met under the  
5 current funding structure. The average CORE rebate has nearly doubled since  
6 2004. The average CORE rebate has increased more than 40% simply since the  
7 2007 program year. With the price of insulation increasing 26% since 2007, and  
8 the price of other weatherization products increasing 10% or more in that time  
9 period, to maintain a relatively steady low-income budget results in a degradation  
10 of the ability of New Hampshire to reach the 10-year objective.  
11

12 **Q. IS THERE ANY OTHER WAY IN WHICH THE LOW-INCOME**  
13 **BUDGET HAS BEEN DILUTED IN RECENT YEARS?**

14 A. Yes. In designing low-income programs, people tend to talk about “the low-  
15 income population” as though it is a single monolithic group. There is, however,  
16 no single group of “low-income” households. New Hampshire presents an  
17 excellent example of where treating “low-income” status as though it is a constant  
18 concept goes awry.  
19

20 The Community Action Agencies (CAAs), when asked to “provide the definition  
21 of ‘low-income’ used for purposes of qualifying customers for the Home Energy  
22 Assistance Program in the CORE energy efficiency programs” for 2004 to the  
23 present inclusive, replied that program eligibility was set at:

- 1           ➤ Less than or equal to 150% of Federal Poverty Level for 2004/2005;  
2           ➤ Less than or equal to 185% of Federal Poverty Level for 2005/2006 going  
3           forward.

4           (CAA-NHLA-07).<sup>8</sup> Eligibility increased further, to 200% of the Federal Poverty  
5           Level, in 2010. As the utilities noted in their response to discovery, “for all years,  
6           the HEA program has defined a customer as ‘low-income’ qualified as being  
7           qualified for the Electric Assistance Program (EAP) or the Fuel Assistance  
8           Program (FAP) or living in federally subsidized housing.” (Util-NHLA-006).

9  
10          The change in the definition of eligibility results in a substantial number of  
11          additional households being defined as “low-income” for purposes of the CORE  
12          program who in prior years would have been eligible to be served through the  
13          non-low-income residential weatherization program. Based on the “Low-Income  
14          Needs Assessment” done for the New Hampshire PUC in June 2008, the  
15          population of households eligible for the low-income CORE efficiency program  
16          would have been:

- 17               ➤ 69,646 households at 150% of Federal Poverty Level;  
18               ➤ 95,542 households at 185% of Federal Poverty Level;  
19               ➤ 111,173 households at 200% of Federal Poverty Level.

20          (CAA-NHLA-10). When asked for their own estimates of the number of “low-  
21          income” customers, the utilities responded in relevant part that “this is a question

---

<sup>8</sup> In contrast, the DOE/WAP eligibility was based on less than or equal to 185% of the Federal Poverty Level for 2004 – 2008. DOE/WAP eligibility was changed to less than or equal to 200% of the Federal Poverty Level on a going forward basis beginning in 2009. (CAA-NHLA-09).

1 better answered by the CAA's who do all the income qualifications of  
2 customers." (Util-TWH-007).

3  
4 **Q. HOW HAS THE BUDGET FOR LOW-INCOME CORE PROGRAMS**  
5 **VARIED DURING THAT SAME TIME PERIOD?**

6 A. In looking at the budget for low-income CORE programs, I examined each  
7 quarterly report filed with the Commission regarding the Home Energy  
8 Assistance Program since 2005. One of the metrics included in each quarterly  
9 report is the "goal" for expenditures on low-income efficiency for the year (and,  
10 by comparison, the actual expenditures). By summing the expenditure "goal" for  
11 each of the four utilities (GSECO, NHEC, PSNH, Unitil), I derived the total  
12 expected low-income expenditures for each year. The low-income CORE budget  
13 was \$2,222,887 in 2005, before declining to \$2,202,250 in 2006 and then to  
14 \$2,079,287 in 2007. The low-income budget then climbed to \$2,441,012 in 2008  
15 and \$2,641,292 in 2009.

16  
17 **Q. HAS THE NUMBER OF LOW-INCOME UNITS SERVED BY THE CORE**  
18 **EFFICIENCY PROGRAM CHANGED DURING THAT SAME TIME**  
19 **PERIOD?**

20 A. Yes. I used the same method for assessing the number of units that the low-  
21 income CORE budget was designed to reach. By summing the "goal" for each of  
22 the utilities for each year, I derived the total number of units that the low-income  
23 budget was expected to serve each year. In 2005, the combined goal was to serve

1 984 low-income units. The low-income goal increased in 2006 to 994 units,  
2 before decreasing in 2007 and 2008 to 968 and 958 units respectively. In 2009,  
3 the goal sharply dropped, to only 691 units to be served through the CORE low-  
4 income efficiency program.<sup>9</sup>

5  
6 **Q. IS THERE OTHER INFORMATION THAT YOU HAVE REVIEWED TO**  
7 **CONFIRM YOUR CALCULATIONS?**

8 A. Yes. I reviewed each CORE energy efficiency filing for 2005 through 2009.  
9 These annual filings confirmed my calculations based on the quarterly reports.  
10 The annual budgets, number of units to be served, and projected life-time electric  
11 savings from those annual filings are set forth in Schedule RDC-2.

12  
13 **Q. WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN YOU DRAW FROM THIS DATA?**

14 A. The data I just discussed supports the following observations:  
15 ➤ From 2005 to 2009, the low-income CORE budget increased by 20% (from  
16 \$2,222,887 to \$2,641,292), while, during that same time period, the low-  
17 income per unit cost of delivering efficiency services increased 61%  
18 (\$1,779.33 to \$2,863.93).  
19 ➤ From 2005 to 2009, the number of low-income households that the CORE  
20 efficiency program was designed to serve decreased by 30% (from 984 units  
21 to 691 units), while, during the same time period, the number of households

---

<sup>9</sup> In each year, the "actual" number of units served has exceeded the "goal" for the year. More than 1,200 units were served through HEA in each year since 2005 according to the quarterly reports. In 2009, while the annual goal was to serve 691 units, the utilities had served 366 through the first two quarters, with 181 more "in process."

1           qualifying for low-income efficiency services increased by 37% (69,646 at  
2           150% of Federal Poverty Level to 95,542 at 185% of Federal Poverty Level).

3  
4   **Q.   WHAT OVERALL CONCLUSIONS DO YOU DRAW FROM THE**  
5   **ABOVE DISCUSSION?**

6   A.   Two impacts are evident from the discussion above.

7       ➤ First, the efficacy of the low-income program has been diluted in the past five  
8       years. The Commission expressly cited the Energy Efficiency Working  
9       Group's discussion of the market barriers that impede low-income households  
10      from investing in energy efficiency. (Order No. 23,574, 17). Notwithstanding  
11      the fact that those market barriers have become more pronounced, not less, in  
12      the years since New Hampshire began its efficiency program, the CORE  
13      energy efficiency program has lost ground relative to delivering low-income  
14      energy efficiency.

15      ➤ Second, contrary to principles established early in the design of the low-  
16      income electric energy efficiency program, starting in 2006, dollars have been  
17      diverted from households with income at or below 150% of the Federal  
18      Poverty Level to households with income between 150% and 185% of Federal  
19      Poverty Level. Even though the diversion has not been direct, it has occurred  
20      nonetheless. This siphoning of low-income dollars has occurred by re-  
21      defining what households fall into the "low-income" sector. Year-by-year,  
22      New Hampshire has expanded its definition of what represents the "low-  
23      income" customer class without expanding the low-income budget to serve

1 those customers. As a result, households that five years ago would have been  
2 served through the budget for the non-low-income residential weatherization  
3 program are today expected to be served through the low-income budget, even  
4 though budget authority was not transferred to the low-income program to  
5 accompany the transfer of budget responsibility. While the modification of  
6 the definition of "low-income" has expanded the "low-income" population by  
7 nearly 40%, the low-income budget has not been correspondingly increased.

8  
9 **PART 2. A FORMULA APPROACH TO**  
10 **LOW-INCOME ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS.**

11  
12 **Q. DO YOU RECOMMEND THAT NEW HAMPSHIRE ADOPT A**  
13 **FORMULA APPROACH TO SETTING A LOW-INCOME ENERGY**  
14 **EFFICIENCY BUDGET?**

15 **A.** Yes. While I conclude that the proposed 2010 budget of 14% is reasonable and  
16 recommend its approval, I recommend that future budget-setting for the low-  
17 income program be based on a formula approach.

18  
19 In making this recommendation, I begin with the proposition that it is not possible  
20 to determine what you want to do before you determine what you want to  
21 accomplish. Setting the low-income budget is not an end unto itself. Rather,  
22 setting the low-income budget is a means to an end, a mechanism to be used in  
23 accomplishing some pre-established objective. My recommendation below is  
24 explicitly tied to the accomplishment of just such a pre-established objective.





1 accomplishing that goal on a year-by-year basis. As I described above, I  
2 recommend that the Commission adopt a goal of serving 50% of all remaining  
3 low-income households over no more than a 10-year period. In short, the formula  
4 is based on the following three-steps:

- 5 ➤ It sets a budget that, if maintained for 10 years, all other things equal, will  
6 serve 50% of all remaining low-income households over no more than a 10-  
7 year period.
- 8 ➤ It adjusts that budget for known and measurable changes in the number of  
9 low-income customers year-by-year.
- 10 ➤ It further adjusts the budget for known and measurable changes in the per-unit  
11 cost of serving each low-income housing unit.

12  
13 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ADJUSTMENT YOU ARE MAKING TO**  
14 **ACCOUNT FOR THE NUMBER OF LOW-INCOME CUSTOMERS.**

15 A. If the number of low-income customers in New Hampshire changes, it clearly will  
16 require either a smaller or larger budget to serve those customers over a period of  
17 no more than 10 years. If the number of low-income customers increases, it will  
18 require a greater budget to serve them. If the number of low-income customers  
19 decreases, it would require a smaller budget. As can be seen, this adjustment  
20 factor can either increase or decrease. The number of low-income customers can  
21 change due to any number of reasons. As has already occurred, the definition of  
22 what constitutes a "low-income" customer might change. Moreover, the economy

1 might change, thus pushing either more or fewer customers into low-income  
2 status.

3  
4 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ADJUSTMENT YOU ARE MAKING TO**  
5 **ACCOUNT FOR CHANGES IN THE CORE PER-UNIT PRODUCTION**  
6 **COST FOR LOW-INCOME MEASURES.**

7 A. As I described above, the per unit production cost of the low-income program has  
8 substantially changed over the last few years. Schedule RDC-01 documents that  
9 the per unit production cost for the CORE share of electric efficiency investments  
10 is now nearly \$2,900, an increase from roughly \$1,600 in 2006. Despite this  
11 increase in per-unit production costs, I seek to smooth these changes in per-unit  
12 production costs. To do so, rather than using the per-unit production cost of any  
13 specific individual year, I recommend that the changes in the per-unit production  
14 cost be based on a three-year average.

15  
16 **Q. WHY DO YOU BASE YOUR BUDGET ON ONLY THE CORE**  
17 **EFFICIENCY EXPENDITURES PER UNIT RATHER THAN ON THE**  
18 **TOTAL EFFICIENCY EXPENDITURES PER UNIT?**

19 A. I recognize that the *total* production cost per unit is greater than the per-unit  
20 production cost paid by the CORE program. In this proceeding, however, we are  
21 setting only the CORE budget. Since this proceeding is designed to look at CORE  
22 revenues, it quite reasonably should thus also consider only the CORE  
23 expenditures.

1

2 **Q. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE HOW YOUR PROPOSED FORMULA WOULD**  
3 **OPERATE?**

4 A. Yes. I provide this example exclusively for the purpose of illustrating how my  
5 recommended formula would operate. Let me assume for purposes of illustration  
6 that the “base year” is 2010.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, the number of HEA-eligible  
7 households at 200% of Federal Poverty Level in the base year is 111,173. The  
8 three-year average per-unit CORE production cost<sup>12</sup> is \$2,407.<sup>13</sup> The base year  
9 budget is \$2,870,141 as filed by the utilities in this proceeding.

10

11 Let me assume, hypothetically, that in the year for which we are making the  
12 formula adjustment, the number of HEA-eligible households becomes 115,000.

13 Let me assume, hypothetically, that in the year for which we are making the  
14 formula adjustment, the three-year average per-unit production cost is \$2,500.

15 The formula adjustment is thus as follows:

16 
$$\$2,870,141 * (115,000 / 111,173) * (\$2,500 / \$2,407) =$$

17 
$$\$2,870,141 * 1.0344 * 1.0386 = \$3,083,472$$

18

19 **Q. UNDER THIS RECOMMENDED FORMULA, CAN THE LOW-INCOME**  
20 **CORE EFFICIENCY BUDGET ONLY INCREASE?**

---

<sup>11</sup> As I describe below, in fact, the “base year” will be the year 2015.

<sup>12</sup> As explained above, the CORE production cost is used rather than the total production cost. Since the formula is used only to establish the CORE budget, it is necessary to limit the production costs exclusively to CORE production costs.

<sup>13</sup> My recommended formula uses a three-year average per-unit production cost. Accordingly, for purposes of this illustration, the base per-unit production cost involves the three year average of 2007, 2008 and 2009  $(\$2,038.14 + \$2,319.18 + \$2,863.93) / 3 = \$2,407.08$ ).

1 A. No. As I describe above, the adjustments under this formula can go either “up” or  
2 “down.” If either the number of low-income households or the per-unit production  
3 cost decreases, the low-income CORE budget (as adjusted by the formula) would  
4 correspondingly decrease as well.

5  
6 To illustrate, let me assume, hypothetically, that the number of low-income  
7 households decreased to 105,000. Let me further assume, hypothetically, that the  
8 per-unit CORE production cost fell to \$2,300. The formula adjustment in this  
9 scenario would be as follows:

10 
$$\$2,870,141 * (105,000 / 111,173) * (\$2,300 / \$2,407) =$$

11 
$$\$2,870,141 * 0.9455 * 0.9555 = \$2,590,215$$

12 In this instance, while the overall low-income CORE budget may have decreased,  
13 the budget would nonetheless still remain on track to meet the 10-year objective.  
14 The budget decline simply reflects a decrease in the number of customers to be  
15 served as well as a decrease in the per-unit cost to serve each customer. While the  
16 budget might decline, in other words, progress toward the 10-year objective  
17 remains constant.

18

19 **Q. WHY DO YOU RECOMMEND USING A THREE-YEAR AVERAGE FOR**  
20 **THE PER-UNIT PRODUCTION COST.**

21 A. In response to discovery, both the Community Action Agencies (CAAs) and the  
22 utilities offered legitimate concerns about how to interpret changes in per-unit  
23 production costs. The per-unit cost can reflect the cost-of-living; the mix of unit

1 sizes; the mix of measures; or the mix of incomes as a percentage of Federal  
2 Poverty Level. (See, Responses of CAAs to NHLA-1(c), NHLA-2, NHLA-6;  
3 Responses of Utilities to TWH-1(c), TWH-2). Rather than introducing significant  
4 volatility into the potential per-unit production cost, the budget is smoothed by  
5 using a three-year average.

6  
7 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT OF A “BASE YEAR” AS YOU**  
8 **RECOMMEND IN YOUR FORMULA.**

9 A. The low-income budget proposed for 2010 in this proceeding is \$2,870,141.

10 While I endorse this budget as reasonable for 2010, this budget is insufficient to  
11 achieve the long-term objective of reaching 50% of all remaining low-income  
12 households over no more than a 10-year period of time. Given the average per-  
13 unit production cost over the past three years (\$2,407), maintaining this budget  
14 could be expected to produce 1,192 units of low-income housing each year treated  
15 with electric efficiency measures ( $\$2,870,141 / \$2,407 = 1,192$ ). Given this rate  
16 of treatment, and assuming no-one needs to be re-weatherized, New Hampshire  
17 will serve:

18 ➤ all remaining of the 111,173 low-income households (below 200% of Federal  
19 Poverty Level) in the State over a 65-year period ( $[111,173 * .697] / 1,192 =$   
20  $65$ ).<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> An adjustment factor of 0.697 is incorporated into this calculation. According to the January 2009 GDS Associates “Additional Opportunities” report, the “fraction of the end use energy that is already energy efficient” is 30.3%. GDS appears to translate that into number of housing units. It reports what it refers to as a “remaining factor (in how many homes can this be installed.” The “remaining factor” for low-income households is set at  $1 - 0.303 = 0.697$ . GDS Associates (January 2009). “Additional Opportunities for Energy Efficiency in New Hampshire: Final Report,” at E-28, E-35, E-56, E-59. It is generally believed that GDS under-counted the number of low-income households (and thus the number of low-income housing units). See, CAA Response, NHLA-10; Utility Response, TWH-009; “Additional

➤ all remaining of the 95,542 low-income households (below 185% of Federal Poverty Level) over a 56-year period ( $[95,542 * .697] / 1,192$  customers per year = 56 years).

➤ all remaining of the 69,646 low-income households (below 150% of Federal Poverty Level) in the State over a 41-year period ( $[69,646 * .697] / 1,192$  customers per year = 41 years).

Clearly, New Hampshire is falling behind in achieving the objective of reaching 50% of the remaining low-income households within a ten-year time period.

**Q. WHAT DO YOU PROPOSE?**

A. Given how New Hampshire has fallen behind in meeting the 10-year objective, I propose that the Commission re-zero its beginning point and newly begin the process of setting a measurable objective for serving low-income households and measuring the progress toward achieving that objective. To meet the 10-year objective would require utilities to invest sufficient funds to reach the number of low-income households, times 0.50 (50%), divided by 10 years, times the average per-unit production cost per household. The CORE program investment would be:

➤ \$9.3 million per year through CORE if the definition of “low-income” is set at 200% of Federal Poverty Level ( $[111,173 * 0.697 * 0.50] / 10$  years \* \$2,407/unit = \$9,324,718 total low-income budget);

---

Opportunities,” note 24; Comments of New Hampshire Legal Assistance on Draft Additional Opportunities Report (December 15, 2008). Accordingly, the penetration of efficiency would be over-stated. The GDS figure of 0.303 is substantially higher than the number of units previously served that the June 2008 Low-Income Needs Assessment, prepared for the Commission, identified. The Commission could, and should, establish the appropriate adjustment factor to use in setting the low-income budget in the base year.

- 1           ➤ \$8.0 million per year through CORE if the definition of “low-income”  
2           is set at 185% of Federal Poverty Level ( $[95,542 * 0.697 * 0.50] / 10$   
3           years \* \$2,407/unit - \$8,015,310 total low-income budget);  
4           ➤ \$5.8 million per year through CORE if the definition of “low-income”  
5           is set at 150% of Federal Poverty Level ( $[69,646 * 0.697 * 0.50] / 10$   
6           years \* \$2,407/unit = \$5,841,890).

7  
8   **Q.    IN BEGINNING THIS GOAL-SETTING PROCESS ANEW, DO YOU**  
9   **PROPOSE TO START WITH FULL FUNDING IN YEAR 1?**

10   A.   No. I do not propose that New Hampshire immediately move to full funding of  
11       the low-income efficiency program. Instead, I propose that New Hampshire  
12       ramp-up the low-income efficiency investments over a five-year period. The  
13       “base-year” would then be the first year of full funding for the low-income  
14       program (2015). The formula adjustments to the low-income efficiency would  
15       begin the first year after the base year (2016).

16  
17   **Q.    CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE RAMP-UP THAT YOU PROPOSE?**

18   A.   Yes. I propose a ramp-up over a five year time period. Using the budget for a  
19       low-income population defined to be households at or below 200% of Federal  
20       Poverty Level, for example, the ramp-up would begin with the 2010 CORE

1 budget of \$2,870,141 as proposed by the utilities in this proceeding, and ramp-up  
2 to \$9,324,718 in equal increments over a five-year period as follows:<sup>15</sup>

3 ➤ 2010 CORE budget: \$2,870,141

4 ➤ 2011 CORE budget: \$4,161,056

5 ➤ 2012 CORE budget: \$5,451,972

6 ➤ 2013 CORE budget: \$6,742,887

7 ➤ 2014 CORE budget: \$8,033,803

8 ➤ 2015 CORE budget: \$9,324,718

9  
10 **Q. DO THESE BUDGETS IMPLY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF LOW-**  
11 **INCOME UNITS TO BE SERVED EACH YEAR?**

12 A. Yes. Since these budgets are designed to reach 50% of all remaining low-income  
13 customers within a 10-year period, there is inherent within them a prescribed  
14 number of low-income units per year. The budgets assume:

15 ➤ 3,874 units per year given a definition of “low-income” at 200% of the  
16 Federal Poverty Level;

17 ➤ 3,330 units per year given a definition of “low-income” at 185% of the  
18 Federal Poverty Level;

19 ➤ 2,427 units per year given a definition of “low-income” at 150% of the  
20 Federal Poverty Level.

21 As is evident, given that the CORE budget is serving only 1,200 low-income  
22 households each year (and has, as its goal, substantially fewer than this per year),

---

<sup>15</sup> Each additional year of increment would be one-fifth of the difference between full funding at the 2010 budget. Given full funding of \$9,324,718 and a 2010 CORE HEA budget of \$2,870,141, each additional annual HEA CORE



1 it is evident that to serve sufficient low-income households to reach 50% of the  
2 remaining low-income population within ten years will require a significant  
3 increase in the number of households served each year.  
4

5 **Q. IS THERE A REGULATORY PRINCIPLE THAT YOU ARE SEEKING**  
6 **TO IMPLEMENT THROUGH YOUR PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR RAMP-**  
7 **UP PERIOD?**

8 A. Yes. Regulatory policy has a principle often referred to as “gradualism” or  
9 “incrementalism.” The principle counsels that the public interest is well-served  
10 when substantial changes are not implemented all at once. The principle of  
11 “gradualism” is often applied in making rate design changes. This same principle  
12 of “gradualism” would counsel that the move to full-funding of a low-income  
13 CORE low-income budget sufficient to serve 50% of all remaining low-income  
14 households within a ten-year period occur over a multi-year ramp-up period. I  
15 endorse the application of that principle to my recommended formula approach to  
16 setting the low-income CORE budget.  
17

18 **Q. HOW DO YOU PROPOSE TO ALLOCATE THE LOW-INCOME**  
19 **EFFICIENCY BUDGET BETWEEN THE RESIDENTIAL AND THE**  
20 **COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMER CLASSES?**

21 A. The low-income budget should be allocated evenly (50%/50%) between  
22 residential customers on the one hand, and the commercial/industrial customers  
23 on the other hand. The Commission has previously held that the costs of low-

---

funding increment would thus be \$1,290,915  $([ \$9,324,718 - \$2,870,141 ] / 5)$ .

1 income energy efficiency should be spread amongst all customer classes. That  
2 principle is a reasonable principle. The need for low-income energy efficiency  
3 investments is not associated with any particular class. Non-low-income  
4 residential customers no more “cause” the need for low-income efficiency  
5 investments than do non-residential customers. Moreover, all customer classes  
6 benefit in particular from low-income energy efficiency investments. For  
7 example, low-income efficiency investments in particular give rise to substantial  
8 economic development impacts that benefit all customer classes.

9  
10 **Q. HAVE YOU ACCOUNTED FOR ANY EXTERNAL FUNDING IN YOUR**  
11 **RECOMMENDATION?**

12 A. Yes. While I do not recommend that external funds generated by the Regional  
13 Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) be used as an offset to the CORE funding, I  
14 acknowledge that such funding exists. RGGI funding used for low-income  
15 efficiency purposes, however, should be used to supplement and not to supplant  
16 CORE program funding. To the extent, if at all, such funds are available to invest  
17 in low-income energy efficiency, the units treated through such funds should be  
18 over and beyond the CORE funding. The “supplement and not supplant” principle  
19 for RGGI funds is an important public policy principle to pursue.

20  
21 In contrast to RGGI funding, DOE/WAP funding should not be used as an offset  
22 either. As I explain above, the average per-unit production cost that I use as the  
23 basis for my CORE budget is the CORE portion of the blended CORE/WAP

1 production cost. The reason I use only the CORE portion of the blended  
2 production cost is because I am setting the CORE budget. If one were to include  
3 DOE/WAP revenues in the budget, it would be necessary to use the total  
4 CORE/WAP production cost.

5  
6 Finally, I do not include American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)  
7 weatherization funds in this budget. ARRA funding is short-term funding. It will  
8 no longer be available at the time that base year calculations are made. To the  
9 extent, if at all, that the Commission wishes to take into account ARRA funding,  
10 the appropriate place to do that would be in setting the adjustment factor in the  
11 base year to account for the number of low-income households that have already  
12 been weatherized. That would not be an unreasonable action for the Commission  
13 to take; it would be conceptually the same as already accounting for the number  
14 of low-income units previously served through HEA and/or through DOE/WAP.

15  
16 **Q. HOW DOES YOUR PROPOSED FUNDING FORMULA RELATE TO**  
17 **FUNDAMENTAL RATEMAKING PRINCIPLES?**

18 A. My proposed funding formula was specifically designed with certain fundamental  
19 ratemaking principles in mind. First, the formula is set using a base period using  
20 experienced costs. Calculation of the base period budget is described in detail  
21 above. Second, future adjustments are based on known and measurable changes.  
22 Any change in the number of low-income customers is a known and measurable

1 change.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the three-year average per-unit production cost would be a  
2 known and measurable change based on utility filings with the Commission.  
3 Finally, the adjustments to the base period would be based on authoritative,  
4 objective figures. Data on the number of low-income households is reported  
5 annually by the U.S. Census Bureau. In addition, per-unit production costs for  
6 CORE low-income measures are routinely reported to the Commission.  
7

8 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOUR RECOMMENDATION RELATES TO**  
9 **PRIOR FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WAY HOME?**

10 A. The Way Home has participated in previous discussions regarding the funding of  
11 low-income energy efficiency programs in New Hampshire. Indeed, through  
12 New Hampshire Legal Assistance, The Way Home has advanced various  
13 proposals for funding low-income efficiency programs. Attached as Appendix A  
14 is a copy of the proposal by The Way Home in Docket No. DE-07-106 (February  
15 8, 2008). At that time, The Way Home set forth four alternative “budget  
16 options”:

- 17 ➤ Option #1: Using a higher SBC percentage for calculation of the HEA  
18 budget;
- 19 ➤ Option #2: Serving a prescribed number of low-income units per year  
20 (suggested to be 3,000);
- 21 ➤ Option #3: Constructing a budget at the average cost of a core job  
22 over 20 years;

---

<sup>16</sup> The count of low-income customers may lag the budget year by two years. For Budget Year 2010, for example, the most recent report of the number of households at various ranges of the Federal Poverty Level would be from 2007.

1                   ➤ Option #4: Increasing the current HEA percentage share of the  
2                   statewide CORE budget.

3                   As is evident from my discussion above, my recommendation is a blending of  
4                   Option #2 and Option #3. I recommend using a prescribed number of low-income  
5                   units per year (as set forth in Option #2). I further recommend using an average  
6                   per-unit production cost (as is set forth in Option #3). The blending of these two  
7                   options, however, is tied to measurable progress toward a pre-established  
8                   objective. My recommendation is not at odds with either Option #1 or Option #4.  
9                   Rather than setting the per-kWh millage rate, or the percentage of budget, as the  
10                  end-in-view for the low-income budget, however, my recommendation views the  
11                  budget as the means to achieve the prescribed objective of serving 50% of all  
12                  remaining low-income households in ten years.

13  
14                  Finally, I agree with the original recommendation of The Way Home that the  
15                  Commission should review the funding formula on a tri-annual basis after the  
16                  formula adjustments begin to operate in 2016. The Commission should set the  
17                  formula in the base year (2015) and adjust the formula as appropriate at the point  
18                  of each three-year review.

19  
20       **Q.     DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

21       **A.     Yes it does.**

## Schedule RDC-01

Cost per Low-Income Unit Weatherized Using Blended DOE/WAP and CORE Program Funding						
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Avg DOE/WAP	\$1,693.54	\$1,496.57	\$1,072.96	\$1,407.22	\$1,563.91	\$3,463.62
Avg CORE rebates	\$1,779.33	\$1,473.86	\$1,576.87	\$2,038.14	\$2,319.18	\$2,863.93
Avg of Project Costs	\$3,472.87	\$2,970.43	\$2,649.83	\$3,445.36	\$3,883.09	\$6,327.55
Q-NHLA-01 (CAAs), Docket DE-09-170						

## Schedule RDC-02

Home Energy Assistance Annual CORE Program Goals: Statewide Budget, Units-to-be-Served, Lifetime Savings			
	Units to be Served	Budget	Life-time Savings
2005	984	\$2,222,887	34,643,945
2006	994	\$2,202,250	17,422,289
2007	968	\$2,079,287	24,016,859
2008	873	\$2,093,062	24,915,865
2009	691	\$2,641,742	19,744,078
SOURCE: Annual CORE Energy Efficiency Filings, Home Energy Assistance (HEA) Program.			

# **APPENDIX A**



**Home Energy Assistance Budget Proposal of The Way Home**

**I. Goals to promote**

1. Energy savings/conservation
2. Lower, more affordable bills for low income customers
3. Address a portion of the need for low income energy efficiency services
4. Improve housing stock

**II. Guiding Principles for a Budget Approach**

1. Prepare the low income budget before other core budgets
2. Restore the 2009 low income budget to its 2006 pre-SB 228 funding level (\$2.222 M)
3. Increase the low income budget, using one of the 4 options described below.
4. Annual increases for inflation
5. Fair share of new revenue sources
6. Periodic review of budget approach

**III. Budget Options**

The following low income budget options are proposed under the framework set forth in the "Report to the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission on Ratepayer – Funded Energy Efficiency Issues in New Hampshire", submitted on July 6, 1999 by the New Hampshire Energy Efficiency Working Group.

1. Option #1. Use a higher SBC percentage for calculation of the HEA budget.
  - 1) In the 1999 Report some members of the Working Group (p. 18) recommended that energy efficiency programs be funded at between 2.5 and 3.2 mills per KWh. This recommended SBC level would be applied to the HEA budget.
  - 2) At 3.2 mills this would increase the HEA budget from \$2.22 M to \$4.0 M (3.2 mills is a 78% increase from 1.8 mills;  $78\% \times \$2.22 \text{ M} = \$1.7 \text{ M}$ ;  $\$1.7 \text{ M} + \$2.22 \text{ M} = \$4.0\text{M}$ ).
  - 3) At 2.85 mills, the midpoint between 2.5 and 3.2 mills, the HEA budget would be increased to \$3.4 M.

2. Option #2. Serve 3,000 low income households per year (instead of 1000) at a budget of \$6.6 M.

1) As noted on page 8 of Order 23,574, dated November 1, 2000, the 1998 Working Group endorsed a low income program proposal (Report pp. 10, A-34, A-35, A-40) that would serve 50,000 low income households (at 150% FPG) over a period of 20 years, at 2,500 households per year, at a cost of \$2.5 M/yr.

2) Assuming 60,000 households at 185% FPG, this would require serving 3,000 households per year ( $60,000 \div 20 = 3,000$ ).

3) The pre-SB 228 budget of \$2.222 M would be increased to \$6.6 M to serve 3,000 households per year ( $3 \times \$2.222 \text{ M} = \$6.6 \text{ M}$ ).

3. Option #3. Construct a budget at the average cost of a core job over 20 years. This would result in a budget of \$6 M.

1) Average cost of a core job (per 2007 3d Quarter Report) is \$2,000 for the 4 utilities.

2) To serve 60,000 low income households would cost \$120 M ( $\$2,000 \times 60,000$ )

3) Over a 20 year period this would cost \$6 M ( $\$120,000,000 \div 20 = \$6 \text{ M}$ ).

4. Option #4. Increase the current HEA percentage share of the statewide core budget.

1) Current average annual HEA percentage is 11%.

2) In order to serve 2000 to 3000 households per year would require:

a) Doubling the HEA budget % to 22% (\$4 M+)

b) Tripling the HEA budget % to 33% (\$6 M+)

#### **IV. Further Discussion of Some Guiding Principles.**

1. Annual Cost of Living (Inflationary) Increase.

1) To offset real loss in budget dollars by increases in cost of goods and services

2) Example: 2008 HEA budget increases (N-Grid: \$40,000; NHEC = \$20,000; PSNH: \$120,000) resulted in only eleven more jobs due to increase in CAA's costs of goods and services.

2. New Sources of Core Revenues.

- 1) HEA budget should not remain stagnant (aside from inflationary increases) if there are significant new revenue sources.
- 2) Purpose to speed up the 20 year timeframe for addressing the low income demand.
- 3) Equitable fair share allocation to HEA.

3. Periodic Reviews of HEA Budget Approach.

- 1) Review budget approach every 3 years, or
- 2) At the option of any party or Staff.